This study develops a model of a multi-tasking executive whose behavior is motivated by the specific forms of compensation received. This model extends the theory of corporate finance in two significant ways: first, it examines risk-averse executive behavior in a multitasking environment, and, second, it yields a theoretical understanding of why one form of variable compensation provides different incentive than another. As a generalization, we find that option compensation is more effective than stock compensation in inducing the executive to take on investment risk, while the inverse is true for inducing the executive to issue debt or pay dividends.
Introduction
In a modern firm, equity holders have largely given up any role in the daily operations of the firm; instead, executives act as their agents and purportedly carry out their wishes through a wide range of activities. Equity holders, however, retain control over executives through compensation policy. This study develops a model of a multi-tasking executive whose behavior is motivated by the specific forms of compensation received. It investigates the effects of different forms compensation on risk-averse executive behavior in a multitasking environment in order to determine how different firm policies are motivated by different compensation structures.
The need for some form of variable incentive as part of an executive"s compensation plan has been long understood, but there is a lack of models explaining why specific types of variable compensation are needed and what effects those different types will have on the behavior of executives. 17 The difficulty is exacerbated by the many forms of variable compensation increasingly in use. 18 Beyond a fixed salary, executives receive, among many other types, bonuses, stock options, premium-priced stock options, performance shares, performance units, restricted equity, phantom equity, dividend-based compensation, etc. 19 If the labor 17 Jackson and Lazear (1991), Choe (1999) and Nohel and Todd (2000) are a few exceptions. 18 Yermack (1993) documents the dramatic increase in the use of variable compensation for managers, while Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan show that executive ownership has also increased.. 19 For the full range and explanations of individual forms, see Smith and Watts (1982) or Murphy (1985) .
market for executive talent is well-functioning, there must exist some undisclosed need for this plethora of forms and means of compensating executives. 20 This study examines the use of two proto-typical forms of variable compensation, an equity position and stock options, as inducements for executives. The first section of the paper reviews the literature and isolates some flaws of earlier models. The second part section constructs a tractable, discrete time model of risk-averse executive behavior. The third section examines the implications of that model, and the fifth section concludes.
Two broad assumptions underpin the model. First, we assume that the firm operates in Berle and Means environment 21 , i.e., equity holders are individually well-diversified, and their numerous asset holdings make it inefficient for them either to devote a significant amount of time to an individual firm or to acquire the necessary firm-specific knowledge. Control is delegated to executives with specialized skills and knowledge who run the firm, but are themselves beholden to the equity holders for compensation. Specifically, we assume that equity holders delegate control over three policy areas: 1) investment policy-executives decide how the firm"s resources are invested, 2) financing policy-executives decide how capital is acquired to fund those projects, 20 It does not seem likely that these are perfect substitutes for each other; however, some researchers assume this: Hall (1998), for instance suggests that exchanging CEO"s stock holdings with options would approximately double pay-to-performance sensitivity. Later we shall see that these two forms of compensation are optimal over different ranges of volatility, and we cannot assume that their characteristics and the behavior they engender are identical. 21 Berle and Means (1932) and Fama and Jensen (1983) . and 3) payout policy-executives decide what level of dividends are distributed to equity holders; but, equity holders retain control over compensation policy-equity holders decide both the levels and forms of compensation given to executives.
Our second assumption concerns the risk preferences of these agents. Executives do not hold diversified portfolios, instead a significant portion of their total income is derived from the firm and their wealth is highly correlated with the value of the firm. 22 Lacking a well-diversified portfolio, executives are highly risk-averse especially relative to equity holders (Amihud and Levi (1981) ).
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The Literature
The "multitasking" problem arises when agents are required to perform multiple tasks that have complex interactions (see Crawford (1994) , Feltham and Xie (1994) , Holmström and Milgrom (1991) , Prendergast (1999) , and Sinclair-Desgagne (1999)). In this context, we jointly model the investment, financing and payout decisions 24 and observe the effects each form of compensation on executive multi-taking behavior.
While a number of studies indicate the need to offer variable compensation (for example, Antia and Mayer (1984) or Watts (1982, 1986 )), few 25 explicitly characterize the optimal forms. 26 This study seeks to fill this gap by constructing a model that predicts the effects of different forms of compensation on executive and (consequently) firm behavior.
Risk-averse executives with fixed compensation are concerned with two liabilities: first, they themselves have a direct claim against the firm for their own future fixed compensation, and, second, since the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy would reduce future fixed compensation, executives are indirectly concerned with future liabilities to debt holders. Executives are concerned that firms retain sufficient wealth to cover both their own future claims and those of debt holders. Both of these induce the executive to reduce investment risk, debt level and dividend payouts in order to safeguard wealth for use 22 See Coffee (1988) for the most developed exposition of the differing risk attitudes of managers and equity holders. There has been relatively little empirical study of the risk aversion of managers, but see Moers and Peek (2000) . 23 This is further substantiated by studies showing that the level of executive compensation is higher in firms with more risk, see Per (1999) . 24 As Holmström (1992) notes, the problem with executive action is not a lack of effort or "slacking", as in other compensation scenarios, but the choosing between efforts toward self-gain rather than shareholder wealth. 25 We shall consider below the handful of studies that distinguish between different forms of compensation. 26 Some studies provide general observations about the advantages of one form of compensation over another, but none offers an explicit model. against these future liabilities.
The Investment Problem: Risk-averse executives have an incentive to lower asset risk to reduce firm volatility below that optimal for equity holders creating the problem of under-investment. A range of models have sought to describe executive risk-taking behavior and the effect upon it of differing compensation design; 27 Most have argued that executives have little opportunity to diversify their wealth portfolio (Heckerman (1975) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Lambert (1986) , Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) , Hermalin (1993) , McConaughy and Mishra (1997), Gray and Cannella (1997) , Murphy (1998) ). 28 Executives can, however, have their compensation altered in such a way that their incentives will be aligned with those of equity holders. Some studies only recommend a generalized form of performance based compensation (e.g., McConaughy and Mishra (1997)), while others specifically model equity (e.g., Bizjak, Brickley and Coles (1993)) or option based compensation (e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) , Green (1984) , Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) ). None of these, however, compare the efficacy of alternate forms of variable compensation in solving the under-investment problem.
The Financing Problem: Risk-averse executives also have an incentive to issue less debt than is optimal for equity holders creating the problem of under-leveraging (Ross (1977) , Grossman and Hart (1982) , Antia and Meyer (1984) , Jensen (1986) , Lang (1987) , Firth (1995) , Mehran (1992) , Garvey and Hanka (n.d.)). 29 While the debt asset substitution problem has occupied much of scholars" interest in capital structure, 30 a second and independent asset substitution problem occurs between managers and equity holders (the asset substitution problem occurs when incentives are not aligned and the agent has an incentive to undertake investments with different 27 The empirical results of these studies, as well as the empirical studies in this area, are reviewed later. 28 A parallel problem can be found in the actions of fund managers (Chevalier and Ellison (1999) , Carpenter (1998)). 29 While managers have, in general, a motive to reduce debt, in the context of a takeover threat, they may have reason to increase debt in order to fend off that threat (Garvey and Hanka (n.d.)). 30 That is, equity holders have an incentive to shift to more risky assets once debt has been issued; the option-like characteristics of levered equity entails that the value of equity is increasing in the volatility of the underlying firm (and the value of debt decreasing). A conflict is created, since the risk of investment may not be fully observable (and thus not contractible by debt holders), and equity holders have the incentive to substitute riskier for less risky investments in order to extract wealth from debt holders once debt has been issued. Debt holders, of course, anticipate this shift, and they charge correspondingly higher rates-unless the equity holders have some mechanism to precommit to an investment policy of low risk. characteristics than the principal, especially with regard to the risk of the investment). Like equity holders, managers also have incentives to shift asset risk-though in a direction opposite to that of equity holders. Managers receiving a fixed, expected compensation from the firm"s cash flows would seek to reduce volatility below that optimal for equity holders. Managers have an interest in reducing the risk of the projects undertaken by the firm, since lower investment risk (or smaller investments in risky projects) will decrease the volatility of firm income. This creates the problem of underinvestment.
The Payout Problem: Finally, risk-averse executives have an incentive to lower dividend yield below that optimal for equity holders creating the problem of the over-retention of earnings (Smith and Watts (1982) , Jensen and Smith (1985) ). Unfortunately, the effect of equity holder-executive conflicts and compensation design on payout policy has been largely neglected. While some scholars have tested the empirical relationship 31 (largely within the tradition of the pay-for-performance studies with dividends as a proxy for performance), theoretical models are scarce. One series of studies develops the notion (Easterbrook (1984) ) of payout policy as a mechanism for reducing agency costs associated with external funding and as a substitute for executive ownership (Rozeff (1982) , Crutchley and Hansen (1989) , Schooley and Barney (1994) , Chen and Steiner (1999) ). Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989) test the possibility that the use of option compensation would reduce dividends, while Fenn and Liang (1999) hypothesize the opposite effect for equity-based compensation. Chang (1993) and White (1996) approach the agency conflict over the payment of dividends themselves, and see dividend-based compensation as a means to force executives to pay them out (rather than mis-use the capital). While individual studies have considered each of these agency conflicts in isolation, none has addressed the multitasking question nor has any offered a rationale for choosing between different forms of variable compensation.
The Model for Executive Multi-Tasking and Compensation
Overview Executives are delegated control over the investment, financing and payout policies of the firm and set these to maximize the utility of their own compensation. Executives are compensated through two contingent claims: option compensation, a European call upon the value of equity (contingent upon the terminal value of the equity); and, second, equity 31 We shall consider these and their consistency with the results of this study below. compensation, a dividend cash flow and a capital gains cash flow. 32 But to model the risk-averse executive, we must further introduce a non-linearity in the form of a utility function with the risk-averse characteristics described below. The value of compensation to the executive is the non-linear, discounted utility of these two contingent claims.
The approach will be to develop a discrete model using a binomial tree structure to represent the value processes of the firm and the securities valued upon it. Executives, under a given compensation structure, will choose the optimal corporate policies (from a discrete set of possibilities) maximizing their own utility.
The Firm
The firm begins with an initial equity endowment, and executives, by implementing different investment, financing and payout policies, may alter that value.
We assume that equity holders and debt holders are well diversified and operate in a complete market, so that we can endogenize the no arbitrage value of both
The Executive
The executive is risk-averse and the executive"s utility function, u(x), is twice differentiable, additive and time independent, i.e., a standard von Neumann-Morgenstein utility function. 33 We use a simple negative exponential utility function, compensation will be increasing in the value of compensation, but decreasing in the volatility of compensation. Further, executives acknowledge a time value to utility and discount future utility by their intertemporal discount rate of utility, r u . Executives obtain all of their wealth from their investment of human capital in the firm. We assume that all executive cash flows are consumed, and that executives do not save, do not hold independent portfolios and cannot hedge the risk of variable compensation.
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Executive Compensation
While there is, in practice, a great range of forms of variable compensation, we consider the two most common. First, executives may receive compensation in the form of equity participation in the firm modeled 32 Equity compensation may be regarded as a contingent claim since it is contingent upon the firm being solvent. 33 This environment is an application of the more general model developed in Mirrlees (1976) , Holmström (1979) , and Grossman and Hart (1983). 34 Ofek and Yermack (1999) show that managers may "unwind" positions if they have and sell shares which they already own.
as a restricted equity plan. That is, conditional upon the solvency of the firm, executives receive dividends cash flows throughout their employment, but only obtain the share value at the terminal date. Second, executives may receive stock options in the form of European call options that can be exercised only at the termination date. 35 The option and equity compensation is initially expressed as a proportion of unlevered firm value: thus, a 1% equity position is a restricted equity grant equal to 1% of the value of the unlevered firm, and a 2% option position is a European call on 2% of the value of the unlevered firm with an exercise price equal to the initial value of the firm and an expiration date equal to the terminal period. After the compensation is awarded, executives select the capital structure maximizing utility. Since the grant of an equity stake to executives is restricted and the options cannot be exercised early, we assume that executives neither participate in the equity repurchase nor exercise options prior to the terminal date, and their equity and option proportions are adjusted for any change in the leverage of the firm.
Executive Objective Function and Choice Variables
Executives have discrete choice variables corresponding to the areas of corporate policy under their sway, i.e., investment, financing and payout policies: they may choose the investment volatility by choosing the standard deviation of aggregate investment risk; 36 they may choose the level of debt by determining the coupon paid to debt holders; 37 and they may choose the payout to equity holders in the form of the dividend yield. The objective function of the executive is to set the optimal investment, financing and dividend policies that maximize their personal utility.
Model Structure
We construct (for a given set of parameters) a binomial tree of the price paths of the unleveled firm. At each node, we can then price equity using the Leland equity formula to obtain a binomial tree of levered equity values (Leland (1994) ). The utility received by the executive at each node is the value of the utility function for the total compensation received at that node. Since there is a time value to utility, executives discount the utility at each node by the intertemporal discount rate of utility. Utility is assumed to be independent and additive, so the 35 These characteristics are consistent with what managers typically receive (Murphy (1998) ). 36 Note that the scale of the investment remains constant, i.e., a change in capital structure is accomplished by issuing debt and repurchasing equity. 37 The Leland (1994) framework models the debt level as a function of the coupon paid. aggregate utility of a compensation structure is the sum of the weighted 38 discounted utility at each node. We utilize a grid search to find the corporate policies that maximize executive utility for a specified compensation structure.
To explore the implications of this model we use a benchmark set of parameters: 39 The firm"s initial equity endowment is $1,000.00. The risk free rate of interest is assumed to be 5% and the corporate marginal tax rate 40%; the former is a typical value for that rate over a long-term economic horizon, later approximates the marginal tax rate for a large corporation. Following general practice (Murphy 1998 ), option compensation is awarded at-the-money, and it has a five year expiration date. The cost of bankruptcy is 10%.
Implications of the Model
While the goal of our study is to examine the implications of compensation structure in a multi-tasking environment, it is worth briefly considering the simpler cases. We begin by examining the effects of the two forms of variable compensation in three cases; namely, those in which the executive has control over only one of the three choice variables (investment, debt and dividend), while the other two are exogenous and constant.
In each figure below, the surface depicts the optimal selection of one choice variable by an executive maximizing personal utility over the possible combinations of option and equity compensation, i.e., each surface consists of points returned by the grid search. The range of equity compensation is allowed to vary from zero to 2%, while the option compensation may vary up to 3%. 40 Thus the origin, in the foreground, depicts the executive"s choice when they have no compensation. The left section of the surface is the region with relatively more equity compensation and the right with relatively more option compensation.
The Single-Tasking Case: Investment Policy
As we would expect, since the value of options are increasing in the volatility of the underlying security, it is option compensation that is most compellingly induces more risky investment, and an increase of 38 For simplicity, we use the pseudo probabilities as weights. 39 While many typical values are used in the benchmark, this is not to imply that the model is in any way "calibrated" to real market conditions. 40 It must be recalled that these values reflect the compensation percentage before the executive employs any leverage. After debt is issued the percentages and consequent compensation and utility are adjusted to compensate for changes in leverage. investment risk is most normally to be associated with option compensation.
The Single-Tasking Cases: Financing Policy and Payout Policy By contrast, stock compensation motivates both the issues of debt and dividends. The executive will take advantage of the tax subsidy for debt over almost any combination of equity and option combination, so long as there is at least some significant equity component in that mixture.
Only in the case of solely option compensation, the executive will not issue debt.
A similar relationship occurs with payout policy. The payment of a dividend provides no additional cash flow to an executive compensated with almost exclusively option compensation, and the payment of a dividend both decreases the value of the stock and increases the expectation of bankruptcy, and, consequently, the executive"s options on that stock.
Increases in both debt level and dividend payments are normally to be associated with option compensation.
The Double-Tasking Case: Financing and Payout Policies
While there are three possible scenarios in which the executive has control over two of the three corporate policies, i.e., investment policy and financing policy, investment policy and payout policy, and financing policy and payout policy, only the last is of interest. In the first two, option compensation influences the executive to raise the level of investment risk, while stock compensation influences the executive either to raise debt or to issue dividends. The case of financing policy and payout policy is more interesting, since both of these were, in the single-tasking cases, motivated by stock compensation.
The behavior of the executive can be described in terms of three "regions" over the policy surfaces:
I. When there is almost exclusively option compensation, the executive neither issues debt nor pays a dividend. II. When the compensation mixture is most heavily dominated by stock compensation the executive both issues debt and pays dividends. But, while the maximum dividend is paid, the maximum level of debt is not issued.
III. When there is a significant amount of both stock and option compensation, but option compensation dominates, the executive issue the maximum level of debt, but does not pay a dividend. Region I is explained for the reasons noted above (0); that is, these actions do not benefit the executive with almost exclusive option compensation.
The other two regions (II and III) imply that the use of debt versus dividend payment presents a trade-off for the executive, though not one that is wholly exclusive. In paying a dividend, the value of the firm declines-thus, decreasing the amount of debt that can be issued. Inversely, issuing debt (since in our model debt is substituted for equity) decreases the possible dividend. The interesting implication of this model is that, in this trade-off, option compensation is more effective in motivating the executive to issue debt, than is stock compensation. This makes intuitive sense, since option compensation is strictly decreasing in the dividend payment, but not in the debt level. 41 41 Recall that a change in capital structure is accomplished by issuing debt and repurchasing equity, and that the executive"s compensation percentages are adjusted to reflect the fact that they do not participate in the equity repurchase.
When stock compensation predominates, executives select the maximum dividend; when option compensation dominates the dividend is reduced and is strictly below that maximum. Dividends have contrasting effects on the compensation cash flows to executives: first, dividends are beneficial in that they allow executives with stock compensation to receive cash flows prior to the terminal period. By decreasing the duration of compensation cash flows, they increase the executive"s utility. Second, however, the payment of dividends decreases firm value and increases the probability of financial distress. Since bankruptcy is costly, this effect decreases the value of both option and equity compensation. With stock compensation, the advantages of dividends predominate over those of debt: executives increase the utility of their compensation more through the payment of dividends, since dividends are fixed cash flows accruing over the life of the compensation structure, and suffer relatively small harm from the increased cost of financial distress. By contrast, with option compensation, there is no advantage to the payment of dividends, and the loss is two-fold: first, there are the costs of financial distress, but, even when the firm remains solvent, the payment of a dividend decreases the probability that the option will be as far in-the-money at expiration. Thus, when the option component of compensation dominates the equity component, the payout ratio is decreased. When option compensation is sufficiently high there is a payout incentive cost.
The Multi-Tasking Case: Investment, Financing and Payout Policies
Finally, we consider the full multi-tasking case, where the executive has control over all three firm policies: investment, financing and payout.
Since this is the central result of the study and the interactions are complicated, we will discuss each region in some detail. Essential to understanding these results is the risk-averse attitude of the executive. While implementing any of the policies may increases compensation and utility, any implementation will increase risk. As we place more policies under the control of the executive, we intensify the risk-return trade-offs and the likelihood that one or more policies will not be implemented.
The curvature of the utility function captures the declining marginal utility of income and places a practical ceiling on the amount of risk that the executive will bear. The executive must choice among the various policies those that will maximize utility (given the specific compensation mixture). Again, we can distinguish a series of "regions" over the policy surfaces:
I: When there is almost exclusively option compensation, the firm neither issues debt nor pays a dividend, since (as we have considered above (0)) neither of these policies increases the utility derived from option compensation. II: As discussed above (0), high levels of stock compensation not only induce the executive to restrict investment risk, but also cause them to select paying dividends over issuing debt when they are mutually exclusive due to the excess risk that employing both policies would engender.
III:
The increase in stock compensation over Region I shifts the executive from increasing investment risk to issuing debt and paying dividends. Since debt increases the utility from option compensation more than do dividends (0), the presence of significant option compensation causes the executive to favor the maximum level of debt over that of dividends. While the connections between compensation structure and firm policies is complex, we can see how the polices implemented by the executive vary over the policy surface in response to two factors: First, the differing incentives of stock versus option compensation, and, second, the limitations placed on the executive"s choices by the "risk ceiling" imposed by a risk-averse utility function.
Conclusion
We know there needs to be a variable component to executive compensation, but a "multitasking" problem arises when agents are required to perform multiple tasks that have complex interactions. We have assumed that equity holders delegate control over three policy areas: 1) investment policy-executives decide how the firm"s resources are invested, 2) financing policy-executives decide how capital is acquired to fund those projects, and 3) payout policy-executives decide what level of dividends are distributed to equity holders. Thus, the decision for equity holders is how to structure compensation so that executives will establish investment, financing and payout policies that are optimal for equity holders.
This model extends the theory of corporate finance in two significant ways: first, it examines risk-averse executive behavior in a multitasking environment, and, second, it yields a theoretical understanding of why one form of variable compensation is preferable to another. Ceteris paribus, we can say that, option compensation is more effective than stock compensation in motivating the executive to increase investment risk, while the inverse is true for motivating the executive to issue debt or pay dividends. Within the trade-off between issuing debt and paying dividends (given that a certain level of stock compensation is present), option compensation motivates the executive to issue debt more than pay dividends. In the single-tasking cases, the model suggests that, in most cases, some option compensation is necessary to stimulate the executive to make any increase in investment risk, while some stock compensation is necessary to stimulate the executive to issue any debt or pay any dividend.
